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Abstract— the monitoring of oil and gas plants using sensors
allows for greater insight into safety and operational
performance. However, as a result of strict installation
regulations of powered sensors near oil and gas fittings, the
introduction of new wired sensors to optimize end-of-lifecycle
plants has been expensive, complex and time consuming. Recent
advances in wireless technology have enabled low-cost Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) capable of robust and reliable
communication. However, the critical WSN security issues have
not been sparsely investigated. The goal of this paper is to define
the security issues surrounding WSNs with specific focus on the
oil and gas industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The monitoring of oil and gas platform performance
through sensors allows for greater insight into potential safety
problems and operational requirements. Sensors may monitor
pipeline pressure, flow, temperature, vibration, humidity, gas
leaks, fire outbreaks, equipment condition and others.
Furthermore, through the use of intelligent techniques and the
monitoring of key historical operation properties, sensor data
may be used to realize certain characteristics and patterns in
typical operations to further promote a safe workplace and
optimize production. However, as a result of very strict
regulations on the installation of wired sensors on oil and gas
platforms, the installations of new sensors to optimize plant
operation has been very expensive, complex and time
consuming [1]. Recent advances in wireless technology have
enabled low-cost wireless solutions capable of robust and
reliable communication. International standards such as the
IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n for wireless local area networks and the
IEEE 802.15.4 for low-rate wireless personal area networks
have facilitated many new applications [1].
Controlling oil and gas infrastructure is highly complex. It
requires many sensors which monitor plant equipment. A
delicate and accurate balance of flows, temperatures, pressures,
and other parameters must be maintained to ensure safe and
productive operation. Unfortunately, two factors have moved
wireless network cyber security quickly up the list of priorities
for oil and gas companies:
• Wireless systems are vulnerable to cyber threats.
• The oil and gas industry forms an attractive target for
cyber-attacks.
II. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS (WSNS)
A sensor is a device that reacts to changes in conditions. It
returns a value of a physical quantity or parameter and
converts the value into a signal for visualization, processing,
recording or automation. Such information can be used to
monitor factory performance and optimize production.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of a large
number of spatially distributed autonomous devices that may
collect data using a wireless medium. They may be used to
cooperatively control and monitor physical or environmental
conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure,
motion or pollutants, at different locations [4]. WSNs exhibit
several unique properties as compared to their wired
counterparts such as large scale of deployment, mobility of
nodes, node failures, communication failures and dynamic
network topologies. In addition, each sensor node has
constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computation
speed and bandwidth as a result of their constraints on size,
battery life and cost [4]. WSN have many applications in both
military and civilian fields such as battlefield surveillance,
habitat monitoring, healthcare, and traffic control and so on.
Many WSN applications require secure communications. Due
to absence of physical protection, the security in WSN is
extremely important [4].
IEEE Std 802.15.4 – Specifies the physical layer and media
access control for low-rate wireless personal area networks
(LR-WPANs). It is maintained by the IEEE 802.15 working
group. It offers lower network layers which focus on low-
power and low-cost ubiquitous communication between
devices with little to no underlying infrastructure where
interaction is performed over a conceptually simple wireless
network [21]. The following layers are considered;
 Physical Layer – This layer provides the data
transmission service along with the interface to the
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physical layer management entity. This layer offers access
to every layer management function and maintains the
database of personal area network. The PHY layer
manages the RF transceiver and performs channel
selection, energy and signal management functions [21].
 Media Access Control (MAC) Layer – The MAC layer
manages the interface as well as access to the physical
channel and network beaconing. In addition, it handles
network association and dissociation functions and
applies unique 64-bit MAC hardware addresses assigned
by the manufacturer. In addition, the MAC layer provides
optional security services including frame encryption,
integrity, and access control. The unit of transmission at
this layer is the MAC frame. The standard Data Link
Layer (DLL) layer in the IEEE model normally consists
of two sub-layers such as MAC sub-layer and a Logical
Link Control (LLC) sub-layer, which is the IEEE 802.2
standard.  It should be mentioned that both the wired
Ethernet network standard (802.3) and the wireless
Ethernet standard (802.11) utilize the standard 802.2 sub-
layer [21].
 Higher Layers – These layers and interoperability sub
layers are not defined in the standard. There exist
specifications, such as ZigBeePRO, WirelessHART and
ISA100, which build on this standard [21].
There are four fundamental frame types (data,
acknowledgment, beacon and MAC command frames), which
provide a reasonable trade-off between simplicity and
robustness. In IEEE 15.4 a super-frame structure, which is
defined by the coordinator, may provide synchronization to
other devices and configuration information. A super-frame
consists of sixteen equal-length slots, which can be further
divided into an active part and an inactive part and may be
used to enter power saving mode [21].
Table 1: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard Specs [21]






























Note: For the purposes of the 802.15.4 standard, the IEEE
considers the 868 MHz and 915 MHz bands to be a single,
contiguous band and vendors that choose to support either
band must support both [21]. The IEEE 802.15.4 Standard
defines a total of 27 channels, numbered 0 to 26. Channel 0 is
in the 868 MHz band with a center frequency of 868.3 MHz
Channels 1 through 10 are in the 915 MHz band, with a
channel spacing of 2 MHz, and channel 1 having a center
frequency of 906 MHz Channels 11 through 26 are in the 2.4
GHz band with 5 MHz channel spacing and channel 11 (2.405
GHz) as the center frequency [22].
A. Communication Channel
A wireless channel is an open communication medium that
can be accessed by everyone within its signal range. However,
this openness is a great benefit as it reduces infrastructure
costs, but it makes security a very important issue as access to
the communication channel. These issues are explained in
below:
 Unreliable Transfer - Unlike fixed wired network
channels, the wireless channel is inherently unreliable. It
is susceptible to interference, channel error, congestion
and devices moving in and out of range. These conditions
could be permanent or temporary and can lead to
damaged or dropped packets on the wireless network. If a
wireless protocol does not provide error handling, it can
lead to incoherent communication or loss of critical
security packets, leading to sensor nodes that are unable
to communicate securely.
 Conflicts - WSN is susceptible to packet collision in the
wireless channel. This occurs when two or more sensor
nodes within each range of each other transmit packets at
the same time. This is a major problem in a highly dense
WSN. In such scenarios, the wireless protocol has to
provide a mechanism for handling traffic
collision/conflicts as retransmission of packets will use
more of the limited sensor node resources [8].
 Latency - Multi-hop routing, network congestion and
node processing can lead to greater latency in the
network. This latency can cause synchronization issues
among sensor nodes that impact WSN security such as
event reporting and cryptographic key distribution [9].
B. Device Limitations
WSNs have additional constraints that hinder the usage of
traditional network security features. Current WSN sensor
nodes are low powered devices with very limited resources.
Therefore, current sensor nodes cannot support complicated
and computationally heavy applications such as the security
algorithms that are used in devices. In fact, implementing
strong security algorithms is a trade-off between security and
performance.
 Processing Power - Alongside the limitations such sensor
nodes have on power consumption, they are also naturally
equipped with limited processors. This restricts the
complexity of the functions that each node can perform
which includes data processing, encoding and encryption
[10].
 Memory and Storage Space - A sensor node has limited
memory and storage space, thus communication packets
need to be small and simple. On average, most sensor
nodes have 8-16bit CPUs with 10-64K of program
memory and 512K-4MB of flash storage [10]. With such
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limited resources, the software codebase used in such
devices has to be very small. Thus, any security and
communication algorithms have to be very small [10].
 Power - Energy usage is another major constraint to
security in WSN. These sensor nodes are physically small
and autonomous, the power source is usually a battery.
The deployment of many such devices would make
replacing these batteries difficult and increase
maintenance costs. Therefore, the batteries installed in
these sensor nodes have to last for a long time (many
years instead of days or hours). It should be mentioned
that implementing security schema in these sensors
require more processing overhead which increases energy
usage and may reduce the overall performance [10].
C. Unattended Operation
One of the major benefits of WSNs is the ability to place
sensor nodes in an environment without any supervision. This
can provide security drawbacks to the network and backend
system if the sensor nodes are located in harsh environments
or in an unsecured manner while being readily accessible to
people.
 Exposure to Environment/Physical Attacks - Sensor
nodes may be deployed in an environment open to
physical attacks and bad weather. For example, sensor
nodes in the ocean might be eaten by fish or washed away
during storms. Since these nodes are in the open, they can
also be attacked or stolen by malicious persons.
 Remote Management - One benefit of WSN is its ability
to be managed remotely. This enables sensor nodes to be
placed in hazardous or inaccessible environments. This
requires security to protect the WSN, devices and the
information that is relayed to the control center. Security
is also required to protect the control center servers since
the WSN might be used by attackers to gain access to the
backend server systems.
 No Fixed Infrastructure - WSNs can self-organize to
form a distributed network without a central management
point among the sensor nodes. This provides a robust and
dynamic communication network for information to be
passed from the sensor nodes to the backend servers.
However, if the WSN is improperly designed, it will make
the network organization difficult, inefficient, and fragile.
The peer-to-peer communication among the sensor nodes
need to incorporate security features that will disallow
malicious users to access or disrupt the sensor network.
III. WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
WSNs form a significant part of the picture as the oil and gas
industry moves into the wireless domain. In a commercial
environment, such networks must operate in a secure manner.
A security breach may cause significant production, safety and
privacy issues. The following sections define the typical
wireless network security requirements in an industrial setting.
A. Access Control
Access control prevents the participation of unauthorized
parties in the network. Legitimate nodes are able to detect and
reject messages from unauthorized nodes.
B. Data Confidentiality
Data confidentiality is one of the most basic security
requirements. The standard approach for providing
confidentiality is to encrypt the data with a secret key that can
only be decrypted by the receiving node [7]. Encryption
should prevent message recovery, as well as preventing
adversaries from learning any information about the messages.
This type of encryption is known as semantic security. One
implication of semantic security is that encrypting the same
plaintext two times should give two different ciphertexts. If
the encryption process is identical for two invocations on the
same message, then semantic security is clearly violated and
the resulting ciphertexts are identical [11]. A common
technique for achieving semantic security is to use a unique
nonce for each invocation of the encryption algorithm. A
nonce can be thought of as a side input to the encryption
algorithm. The main purpose of a nonce is to add variation to
the encryption process when there is little variation in the set
of messages. Since the receiver must use the nonce to decrypt
messages, the security of most encryption schemes does not
rely on nonces being secret. Nonces are typically sent in the
clear and are included in the same packet with the encrypted
data.
In sensor networks, the confidentiality relates to the following
[11]:
 A sensor network should not leak sensor readings to its
neighbors, as it may contain sensitive data.
 A sensor network requires a secure channel to transmit
sensitive data, such as key distributions.
 Public sensor information, such as sensor identities and
public keys, should also be encrypted to some extent to
protect against traffic analysis attacks.
C. Data Authenticity
Another major security concern is the authenticity of the
source providing the data received from the WSN. An attacker
can feed false information by masquerading as a legitimate
sensor node and transmitting this data to the receiver. So the
receiver needs to ensure that the data used originates from the
correct source and has not been tampered with. Besides
information processing, authentication is required for
administrative tasks over the network, such as network
reprogramming or controlling of the sensor node duty cycle
[11]. Thus, message authentication is important for networked
devices to positively identify the source of the communication.
The most common method of providing packet authentication
is through a Message Authentication Code (MAC). When a
sender and receiver share a secret key, the sender can compute
the MAC of the data to be sent and embed it in the packet.
When the destination node receives a packet with a correct
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MAC, it knows the source of the packet and that the packet
has not been modified in transit [7].
D. Data Integrity
The data transmitted by a legitimate source might be modified
or corrupted in transit. Attackers can introduce interference,
such as add or delete some bits, to transmitted packets.  A
malicious routing node can change important data in packets
before forwarding them.  The integrity of data ensures that the
received data is complete and correct. The recipient of a
message which has been tampered with whilst in transit will
be able to detect that this has occurred. Message authentication
and integrity will be increased by including a MAC with each
packet. Only authorized senders and receivers will be able to
view the message as they share a secret cryptographic key
which computes MAC. Authentication methods like MAC are
used so that the receiver can easily know if a packet has been
tampered with or is corrupted. Due to the unreliable nature of
the wireless medium, packet loss or damage can occur without
the presence of a malicious node in the network. Data integrity
ensures that any received data has not been altered in transit
[11].
E. Data Freshness
Legitimate messages being sent between two nodes may at
times be monitored by unauthorized parties which will later be
replayed, and due to the fact that they are originating from an
authorized sender, with a valid Message Authentication Code
Message, they will be accepted. WSNs need to ensure the
freshness of each message. For example, the data is recent,
and that no old messages have been replayed. This
requirement is important for key management since shared
keys need to be changed over time. However, it takes time for
new shared keys to be propagated to the entire network. In this
case, it is easy for an attacker to use a replay attack, which
protects against using sequential numbering, to join the
network with an older key. The use of a nonce, or another
time-related counter, can be added into the packet to ensure
data freshness. These counters are reset every time a new key
is created [11]. Besides security, data freshness is important in
certain situations, such as using sensor nodes to monitor
mission critical operations. Any disruption or delay to the data
received can have a negative impact to the operations or safety
of the personnel/equipment.
F. Availability
Traditional encryption algorithms used in fixed wired
networking must be adapted to low powered sensor nodes to
maximize the usage of the nodes in a WSN. Some adaptations
modify the encryption/decryption code to reuse as much code
as possible while others try to make use of additional
communication to achieve the same goal. Some adaptations
force strict limitations on the data access, or propose an
unsuitable scheme (such as a central point scheme) in order to
simplify the algorithm. However, all these approaches weaken
the availability of a sensor node and WSN for the following
reasons[11]:
Additional computation consumes additional energy. If no
more energy exists, the data will no longer be available and
increases the chance of incurring a communication conflict.
A single point failure will be introduced in the central point
scheme. This greatly threatens the availability of the network.
G. Secure Localization
In some cases, the utility of a WSN relies on its ability to
accurately locate each sensor node in the network. A sensor
node that is placed in a particular location to monitor its
environment will need to relay its readings along with the
location data for it to be truly useful. Unfortunately, an
attacker can easily manipulate non-secured location data by
reporting false signal strengths or replaying signals.
Alongside the security requirements that were outlined in this
section, there exist a number of threats on these concepts. It is
required that WSNs employ strict security schemes to protect
against the many WSN attacks that have been documented in
the following section.
IV. ATTACKS ON WIRELESS NETWORKS
WSNs must implement strict encryption, transmitter
authentication and data consistency validation with constraints
on energy, memory, computation and network bandwidth. The
following sections define a cross section of the typical attacks
that may affect WSN installations.
A. Generic Wireless Network Attacks
In general, wireless networks are susceptible to various
security issues. In such sensitive commercial environments it
is essential that security is assured from generic attacks such
as:
 Accidental Association - Refers to unintentional access
to wireless networks where foreign computers or devices
may inadvertently connect to an overlapping neighboring
wireless network without being aware that this is even
happening. This still represents a significant security
breach in proprietary network and may expose sensitive
company systems and data [1].
 Malicious Association - Is created when access to a
network is obtained by hackers. This is typically
performed through weak security measures and protocol
loopholes. It may also be possible to lure computers to
login to networks that impersonate the real thing by
exploiting faults in the wireless protocol. By temporarily
disrupting the response of a real network and
simultaneously granting access to an impostor equivalent
it is possible to involuntarily capture a user and
transparently route all future communications through a
central hacker point. This makes it possible to capture
valid users, steal passwords and data, launch other attacks
and install Trojans [1].
 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks – Man-in-the-Middle
Attacks use the Malicious Association techniques to gain
access to a network and its users and transparently
monitor passing traffic. If data is unencrypted or is easy to
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decipher then a hacker is given access to sensitive
company information. A hacker may transparently listen
to, remove and/or replace key network packets with others
to provide false information [1].
 Denial of Service – A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS)
attack occurs when a targeted access point or device is
flooded with bogus protocol messages and data in an
attempt to reduce or even suspend its responsiveness and
ability to perform its regular functions. This is a very
serious problem when wireless devices may be required to
deliver time critical data. Jamming the wireless
communication link utilizing dedicated jamming devices
also falls into the Denial-of-Service category [16].
 Network Injection – A network injection attack makes
use of access points that are exposed to non-filtered or
broadcast network traffic, by introducing bogus network
configuration commands that may affect routers,
switches, and intelligent hubs. The network devices may
crash, shutdown, restart or even require reprogramming.
 Radio Interference – As more and more wireless
communication devices utilize the license free portions of
the frequency spectrum, in particular the ISM bands,
friendly coexistence between the different systems and
technologies is of greatest importance.
 Environment Tampering – The adversary in principle
can compromise the integrity of the sensor readings by
tampering with the deployment area. For example, the
adversary can place a magnet on top of a magnetometer,
or temper with the temperature of the environment around
temperature sensors. This is an effective attack against
service integrity. The main drawback of this attack is the
high risk of apprehension if the network is under some
kind of surveillance [13].
 Byzantine Attack – Wireless sensor networks are
vulnerable to Byzantine attacks in which a fraction of
sensors are tampered. In this attack, the intruder can
reprogram the compromised sensors and authenticate
them and compromised sensors collaboratively send
fictitious observations to the center. This attack eventually
results in severe consequences as the network operation
may seem to operate normal to the other nodes [14].
B. Specific Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) Attacks
Specific WSN attacks include any action that intentionally or
unintentionally aims to cause any damage to the network.
They can be divided according to their origin or their nature.
An origin-based classification splits attacks into two
categories, external and internal, whereas a nature-based
classification splits them into passive attacks and active
attacks.
C. External Attacks and Internal Attacks
Usually, a WSN is deployed and managed by one authority.
All the nodes in the network can be seen as honest and
cooperative entities, whereas attackers have no right to access
the network. External attacks are those launched by a node
that does not belong to the logical network, or is not allowed
to access to it. Such attacks are launched only from outside of
the scope of the network. The impact of external attack is
limited. If an attacker can obtain authorization to access the
network, it becomes an internal attacker. In this case, the
attacker can cause more severe damage because it is seen as a
legitimate entity. Usually, an attacker can become an internal
one by compromising a legitimate node or by deploying
malicious nodes that can pass the network access control
mechanism [3].
D. Passive Attacks
In a passive attack, the attacker’s goal is to obtain information
without being detected. Usually, the attacker remains quiet and
eavesdrops on passing traffic. If it knows the communication
protocols, the attacker can follow those protocols like normal
sensor nodes. A passive attack is a continuous collection of
information from one or multiple targets that might be used
later when launching an active attack. By passively
participating in the network, the attacker collects a large
volume of traffic data and carries out analysis on the data such
that some secret information can be extracted. It should be
mentioned that due to the nature of the wireless
communication medium which is widely shared, it is easier for
an attacker to passively eavesdrop in this environment than in
traditional wired environments [3].
 Eavesdropping - The confidentiality objective is required
in sensors’ environment to protect information travelling
between the sensor nodes of the network or between the
sensors and the base station from disclosure, since an
adversary having the appropriate equipment may
eavesdrop on the communication. By eavesdropping, the
adversary could overhear critical information such as
sensing data and routing information. Based on the
sensitivity of the stolen data, an adversary may cause
severe damage by using this data for many illegal
purposes. By listening to the data, the adversary could
easily discover the communication contents [12].
 Traffic Analysis - Traffic analysis attacks allow an
adversary to deduce information about the network
topology and the location of the base station by
monitoring traffic transmission patterns. Once the
topology of the network is known, the attacker can
selectively target nodes to attack [12].
E. Active Attacks
In an active attack, the attacker exploits the security holes in
the network protocol stack to launch various attacks such as
packet modification, injection, or replaying. The impact of
active attacks is more severe than passive attacks. However,
additional anomalies can show evidence of malicious attacks
because the attacker is actively involved in network
communications [3].
Active attacks include almost all attacks launched by actively
interacting with victims, such as: sleep deprivation torture,
which targets the batteries; hijacking, in which the attacker
takes control of a communication between two entities and
masquerades as one of them; jamming, which causes channel
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unavailability by overusing it, attacks against routing protocols
that we will see in the next section, and so on. Most of these
attacks result in a Denial of Service (DoS), which is
degradation or a complete halt in communication between
nodes.
 Replay - This attack happens when an adversary
keeps messages and re-transmits the contents of
those packets at a later time. Data freshness
implies that the data is recent, and it ensures that
an adversary has not replayed old messages [6].
 Misbehavior - Unauthorized behavior of an
internal node that can result unintentionally in
damage to other nodes. The aim of the node is not
to launch an attack, but it may have other aims
such as obtaining an unfair advantage compared
with the other nodes. One may not correctly
execute the MAC protocol, with the intent of
getting higher bandwidth, or it may refuse to
forward packets for others to save its resources,
while using their resources and asking them to
forward its own packets [15].
In addition, various security requirements on sensor networks
are classified depend on those requirements, into three security
levels:
 Message-Based Level - Similar with that in conventional
networks, this level deals with data confidentiality,
authentication, integrity and freshness. Symmetric key
cryptography and message authentication codes are
necessary security primitives to support information flow
security. Also data freshness is necessarily required as lots
of content-correlative information is transmitted on a
sensor network during a specific time [12].
 Node-Based Level - Situations such as node compromise
or capture are investigated on this level. In case that a
node is compromised, loaded secret information may be
improperly used by adversaries [12].
 Network-Based Level - On this level, more network-
related issues are addressed, as well as security itself. A
major benefit of sensor networks is that they perform in-
network processing to reduce large streams of raw data
into useful aggregated information. Protecting it is
critical. The security issue becomes more challenging
when discussed seriously in specific network
environments. Firstly, securing a single sensor is
completely different from securing the entire network,
thus the network-based anti-intrusion abilities have to be
estimated. Secondly, network parameters such as routing,
node’s energy consumption, signal range, network density
and so on, should be discussed correlatively. Moreover,
the scalability issue is also important with respect to the
redeployment of node addition and revocation [12].
Figure 1: WSN Security Concerns [12]
V. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an active attack that
occurs when a targeted access point or device is flooded with
data in an attempt to reduce or even suspend its responsiveness
and ability to perform its regular functions. This is a very
serious problem when wireless devices may be required to
deliver time critical data. A DoS attack is generally defined as
an event that can diminish or eliminate a network’s capacity to
perform its expected function. Sensor networks are usually
divided into layers, and this layered architecture makes WSNs
vulnerable to DoS attacks as DoS attacks may occur in any
layer of a sensor network [16]. Lists of these attacks are
identified below:
A. Physical Layer Attacks
 Jamming – This type of attack interferes with
(disrupts) the radio frequencies a WSN uses. A
typical jamming attack can disrupt the entire
WSN with a few randomly distributed jamming
nodes. This type of attack is simple to implement
and is very effective against single frequency
networks. There are two types of jamming,
constant jamming and sporadic jamming. Both
these attacks can cause major disruptions to
networks, particularly if the communication is
sensitive or time critical. A sensor node can easily
distinguish jamming from other natural causes of
communication disruption by determining that
constant energy, not lack of response, impedes
communication. If a sensor node does not know it
is being jammed, it will increase its transmitter
power, thus depleting its resources faster [17].
B. Link Layer Attacks
 Collision – An attacker can induce a collision in
the WSN to create a costly exponential back-off
in some MAC protocols. The energy spent by an
attacker is minute compared to the amount of
energy that will be expanded by the WSN. The
use of error-correcting codes can minimize
collision errors, but they are very simple so as to
reduce processing costs. A malicious node can
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cause more collisions to occur than the error
correcting codes can handle in a WSN [18].
 Resource Exhaustion - A naive link-layer
protocol may attempt repeated retransmissions
due to collision. This will lead to exhaustion of
battery resources in sensor nodes in the WSN as
well as delays in transmissions. Random back-
offs only decrease the probability of inadvertent
collision and would be ineffective at preventing
this kind of attack. Time-division multiplexing
gives each node a slot for transmission without
requiring arbitration for each frame. A malicious
node could constantly request for channel access
or elicit a response from sensor nodes in the
WSN. Although, constant transmission would
exhaust the energy resources of both malicious
nodes and targeted sensor nodes, the lifespan of
the WSN would reduce significantly [18].
 Unfairness - Intermittent application of these
attacks or abusing a cooperative MAC-layer
priority scheme can cause unfairness, a weaker
form of DoS. This threat may not entirely prevent
legitimate access to the channel, but it could
degrade service. For example, by causing users of
a real-time MAC protocol to miss their deadlines
[18].
C. Network Layer Attacks
 Wormhole Attack - A wormhole is a low latency link
between two portions of the network over which an
attacker replays network messages. This link may either
be a single node forwarding messages between two
adjacent but otherwise non-neighboring nodes or a pair of
nodes in different parts of the network with the ability to
communicate between each other. The latter of these
cases is closely related to the sinkhole attack as an
attacking node near the base station can provide a one hop
link to that base station via the other attacking node in a
distant part of the network[16]. A wormhole attack is one
in which a malicious node eavesdrops on a packet or
series of packets, tunnels them through the sensor network
to another malicious node, and then replays the packets.
This can be done to misrepresent the distance between the
two colluding nodes. It can also be used to more generally
disrupt the routing protocol by misleading the neighbor
discovery process [19].
 Rushing Attack - Most on-demand routing protocols rely
on broadcast ROUTE-REQUESTs to find routes. In a
rushing attack, an attacker can forward ROUTE-
REQUESTs more quickly than legitimate nodes so that it
is more possible that the chosen route includes the
adversary. If not overcome, the rushing attack can prevent
secure on-demand routing protocols to find routes longer
than two-hops [20]. The widely used duplicate
suppression technique, when a node only considers the
first copy of a given control packets and drops any further
copies, makes the rushing attack possible.
 Acknowledgment Spoofing - Routing algorithms used in
sensor networks sometimes require acknowledgments to
be used. An attacking node can spoof the
acknowledgments of overheard packets destined for
neighboring nodes in order to provide false information to
those neighboring nodes. For instance, it can claim that
false information like a node is alive when in fact it is
dead [16].
 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information -
The most direct attack against a routing protocol in any
network is to target the routing information itself while it
is being exchanged between nodes. An attacker may
spoof, alter, or replay routing information in order to
disrupt traffic in the network. These disruptions include
the creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling
network traffic from selecting nodes, extending and
shortening source routes, generating fake error messages,
partitioning the network, and increasing end-to-end
latency [16].
D. Transport Layer Attacks
 HELLO Flood Attack - An attacker sends or replays a
routing protocol’s HELLO packets from one node to
another with more energy. This attack uses HELLO
packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in WSN. In
this type of attack an attacker with a high radio
transmission range and processing power sends HELLO
packets to a number of sensor nodes that are isolated in a
large area within a WSN. As a result, while sending the
information to the base station, the victim nodes try to go
through the attacker as they know that it is their neighbor
and are ultimately spoofed by the attacker.
 Desynchronization - An existing connection between
two end points can be disrupted by desynchronization. In
this attack, the adversary repeatedly forges messages to
one or both end points. These messages carry sequence
numbers or control flags that cause the end points to
request retransmission of missed frames. If the adversary
can maintain proper timing, it can prevent the end points
from exchanging any useful information, causing them to
waste energy in an endless synchronization-recovery
protocol [18].
In general, all attacks are classified in Figure 2 in below. The
figure shows attacks may happen in Oil and Gas rigs, which
WSNs devices installed.
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Msg = message-based attacks
Node = node-based attacks
Nwk = network-based attacks
Figure 2: Taxonomy of WSN attacks
VI. CONCLUSION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are generating significant
interest as the oil and gas industry moves into the wireless
domain. Such technology has the potential to be beneficial in
many regards. Eliminating the need for cables can contribute
to reduced installation and operating costs; it enables
installations in remote areas, and allows for cost-efficient,
temporary and mobile systems.
A level of security risk must be accepted with WSNs. The key
to a productive environment with WSNs is one where
addressable security issues are dealt with and others are
managed and accepted. In the oil and gas industry specific
configurations, this may mean that WSN devices are not
ultimately relied on for critical tasks, they are used only as a
form of redundancy and appropriate contingency, management
and mitigation plans exist if their function is interrupted or
modified.
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